What’s the difference, and why it matters for inventory planning.

Those new to the parts planning game are often confused by the many variations in the names of parts. This blog points out distinctions that do or do not have operational significance for someone managing a fleet of spare parts and how those differences impact inventory planning.

For instance, what is the difference between “spare” parts and “replacement” parts? In this case, the difference is their source. A spare part would be purchased from the equipment’s manufacturer, whereas a replacement part would be purchased from a different company. For someone managing a fleet of spares, the difference would be two different entries in their parts database: the source would be different, and the unit price would probably be different. It is possible that there would also be a difference in the useful life of the parts from the two sources. The “OEM” parts might be more durable than the cheaper “aftermarket” parts. (Now we have four different terms describing these parts.) These distinctions would be salient for optimizing an inventory of spares. Software that computes optimal reorder points and order quantities would arrive at different answers for parts with different unit costs and different rates of replacement.

Perhaps the largest distinction is between “consumable” and “repairable” or “rotable” parts. The key distinction between them is their cost. It is foolish to try to repair a stripped screw; just throw it out and use another one. But it is also foolish to throw out a $50,000 component if it can be repaired for $5,000. Optimizing the management of inventory for fleets of each type of part requires very different math. With consumables, the parts can be regarded as anonymous and interchangeable. With “rotatables”, each part must essentially be modeled individually. We treat each as cycling through states of “operational,” “under repair,” and “standby/spare.” Decisions about repairable parts are often handled by a capital budgeting process, and the salient analytical question is, “what should be the size of our spares pool?”

There are other distinctions that can be drawn among parts. Criticality is an important attribute. The consequences of part failure can range from “we can take our time to get a replacement” to “this is an emergency; get those machines back in action pronto”. When working out how to manage parts, we must always strike a balance between the benefits of having a larger stock of parts and the dollar costs. Criticality shifts the balance toward playing it safe with larger inventories. In turn, this dictates higher planning targets for part availability metrics such as service levels and fill rates, which will lead to larger reorder points and/or order quantities.

If you Google “types of spare parts”, you will discover other classifications and distinctions. From our perspective at Smart Software, the words matter less than the numbers associated with parts: unit costs, mean time before failure, mean time to repair and other technical inputs to our products that work out how to manage the parts for maximum benefit.

We often encounter Excel-based reorder point planning methods.  In this post, we’ve detailed an approach that a customer used prior to proceeding with Smart.  We describe how their spreadsheet worked, the statistical approaches it relied on, the steps planners went through each planning cycle, and their stated motivations for using (and really liking) this internally developed spreadsheet.

Their monthly process consisted of updating a new month of actuals into the “reorder point sheet.”  An embedded formula recomputed the Reorder Point (ROP) and order-up-to (Max) level.  It worked like this:

• ROP = LT Demand + Safety Stock
• LT Demand = average daily demand x lead time days (assumed constant to keep things simple)
• Safety Stock for long lead time parts = Standard deviation x 2.0
• Safety Stock for short lead time parts = Standard deviation x 1.2
• Max = ROP + supplier-dictated Minimum Order Quantity

Historical averages and standard deviations used 52-weeks of rolling history (i.e., the newest week replaced the oldest week each period).  The standard deviation of demand was computed using the “stdevp” function in Excel.

Every month, a new ROP was recomputed. Both the average demand and standard deviation were modified by the new week’s demand, which in turn updated the ROP.

The default ROP is always based on the above logic. However, planners would make changes under certain conditions:

1. Planners would increase the Min for inexpensive parts to reduce risk of taking an on-time delivery hit (OTD) on an inexpensive part.

2. The Excel sheet identified any part with a newly calculated ROP that was ± 20% different from the current ROP.

3. Planners reviewed parts that exceed the exception threshold, proposed changes, and got a manager to approve.

4. Planners reviewed items with OTD hits and increased the ROP based on their intuition. Planners continued to monitor those parts for several periods and lowered the ROP when they felt it is safe.

5. Once the ROP and Max quantity were determined, the file of revised results was sent to IT, who uploaded into their ERP.

6. The ERP system then managed daily replenishment and order management.

Objectively, this was perhaps an above-average approach to inventory management. For instance, some companies are unaware of the link between demand variability and safety stock requirements and rely on rule of methods or intuition exclusively.  However,  there are problems with their approach:

1. Manual data updates
The spreadsheets required manual updating. To recompute, multiple steps were required, each with their own dependency. First, a data dump needed to be run from the ERP system.  Second, a planner would need to open the spreadsheet and review it to make sure the data imported properly.  Third, they needed to review output to make sure it calculated as expected.  Fourth, manual steps were required to push the results back to the ERP system.

2. One Size Fits All Safety Stock
Or in this case, “one of two sizes fit all”. The choice of using 2x and 1.2x standard deviation for long and short lead time items respectively equates to service levels of 97.7% and 88.4%.    This is a big problem since it stands to reason that not every part in each group requires the same service level.  Some parts will have higher stock out pain than others and vice versa. Service levels should therefore be specified accordingly and be commensurate with the importance of the item.  We discovered that they were experiencing OTD hits on roughly 20% of their critical spare parts which necessitated manual overrides of the ROP.  The root cause was that on all short lead time items they they were planning for an 88.4% service level target. So, the best they could have gotten was to stock out 12% of the time even if “on plan.”   It would have been better to plan service level targets according to the importance of the part.

3. Safety stock is inaccurate.  The items being planned for this company are spare parts to support diagnostic equipment.  The demand on most of these parts is very intermittent and sporadic.  So, the choice of using an average to compute lead time demand wasn’t unreasonable if you accept the need for ignoring variability in lead times.  However, the reliance on a Normal distribution to determine the safety stock was a big mistake that resulted in inaccurate safety stocks.  The company stated that its service levels for long lead time items ran in the 90% range compared to their target of 97.7%, and that they made up the difference with expedites.  Achieved service levels for shorter lead time items were about 80%, despite being targeted for 88.4%.    They computed safety stock incorrectly because their demand isn’t “bell shaped” yet they picked safety stocks assuming they were.  This simplification results in missing service level targets, forcing the manual review of many items that then need to be manually “monitored for several periods” by a planner.  Wouldn’t it be better to make sure the reorder point met the exact service level you wanted from the start?  This would ensure you hit your service levels while minimizing unneeded manual intervention.

There is a fourth issue that didn’t make the list but is worth mentioning.  The spreadsheet was unable to track trend or seasonal patterns.  Historical averages ignore trend and seasonality, so the cumulative demand over lead time used in the ROP will be substantially less accurate for trending or seasonal parts. The planning team acknowledged this but didn’t feel it was a legitimate issue, reasoning that most of the demand was intermittent and didn’t have seasonality.  It is important for the model to pick up on trend and seasonality on intermittent data if it exists, but we didn’t find their data exhibited these patterns.  So, we agreed that this wasn’t an issue for them.  But as planning tempo increases to the point that demand is bucketed daily, even intermittent demand very often turns out to have day-of-week and sometimes week-of-month seasonality. If you don’t run at a higher frequency now, be aware that you may be forced to do so soon to keep up with more agile competition. At that point, spreadsheet-based processing will just not be able to keep up.

In conclusion, don’t use spreadsheets. They are not conducive to meaningful what-if analyses, they are too labor-intensive, and the underlying logic must be dumbed down to process quickly enough to be useful.  In short, go with purpose-built solutions. And make sure they run in the cloud.

Why Days of Supply Targets Don’t Work when Computing Safety Stocks

CFOs tell us they need to spend less on inventory without impacting sales.  One way to do that is to move away from using targeted day of supply to determine reorder points and safety stock buffers.   Here is how a days of supply model works:

1. Compute average demand per day and multiply the demand per day by supplier lead time in days to get lead time demand
2. Pick a days of supply buffer (i.e., 15, 30, 45 days, etc.). Use larger buffers being used for more important items and smaller buffers for less important items.
3. Add the desired days of supply buffer to demand over the lead time to get the reorder point. Order more when on hand inventory falls below the reorder point

Here is what is wrong with this approach:

1. The average doesn’t account for seasonality and trend – you’ll miss obvious patterns unless you spend lots of time manually adjusting for it.
2. The average doesn’t consider how predictable an item is – you’ll overstock predictable items and understock less predictable ones. This is because the same days of supply for different items yields a very different stock out risk.
3. The average doesn’t tell a planner how stock out risk is impacted by the level of inventory – you’ll have no idea whether you are understocked, overstocked, or have just enough. You are essentially planning with blinders on.

There are many other “rule of thumb” approaches that are equally problematic.  You can learn more about them in this post. 

A better way to plan the right amount of safety stock is to leverage probability models that identify exactly how much stock is needed given the risk of stock-out you are willing to accept.   Below is a screenshot of Smart Inventory Optimization that does exactly that.  First, it details the predicted service levels (probability of not stocking out) associated with the current days of supply logic.  The planner can now see the parts where predicted service level is too low or too costly.  They can then make immediate corrections by targeting the desired service levels and level of inventory investment. Without this information, a planner isn’t going to know whether the targeted days of safety stock is too much, too little, or just right resulting in overstocks and shortages that cost market share and revenue.